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Taking on Japanese whalers: the Humane Society International litigation
Abstract
On 14 July 2006 the Full Federal Court declared that Humane Society International ('HSI') could
commence proceedings against Japanese whalers for alleged violations of the Australian Whale
Sanctuary in Antarctica. 1 The decision was a significant victory for the public interest organisation, which
had originally been denied leave to serve originating process on the Japanese defendant on the grounds
that the action could be contrary to Australia's national interests. 2 In its amended statement of claim3
HSI alleged that between February 2001 and March 2005, the respondent Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd
('Kyodo') had unlawfully killed or interfered with around 385 Antarctic Minke whales in the Australian
Whale Sanctuary located off the coast of the Australian Antarctic Territory ('AAT'). HSI also gave
particulars of a permit issued to Kyodo by the Japanese Government for an ongoing whale research
program. This permit indicated that the killing of whales would continue. This note briefly examines the
background to the litigation. It then goes on to consider the progress of the case through the Federal
Court, highlighting the various factors that have attracted the Court's attention at each stage. It first
considers the judgment of Allsop J, and his unusual invitation to the Australian Government to make
submissions regarding aspects of the case. It then analyses the decision of the Appeal Court, concluding
with a consideration of the case's broader Antarctic context and possible implications for environmental
litigation more generally.
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Taking on Japanese Whalers: The Humane
Society International Litigation
RUTH DAVIS*

Introduction
On 14 July 2006 the Full Federal Court declared that Humane Society
International ('HSI') could commence proceedings against Japanese
whalers for alleged violations of the Australian Whale Sanctuary in
Antarctica. 1 The decision was a significant victory for the public interest
organisation, which had originally been denied leave to serve originating
process on the Japanese defendant on the grounds that the action could be
contrary to Australia's national interests. 2
In its amended statement of claim 3 HSI alleged that between February
2001 and March 2005, the respondent Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd
('Kyodo') had unlawfully killed or interfered with around 385 Antarctic
Minke whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary located off the coast of
the Australian Antarctic Territory ('AAT'). HSI also gave particulars of
a permit issued to Kyodo by the Japanese Government for an ongoing
whale research program. This permit indicated that the killing of whales
would continue.
This note briefly examines the background to the litigation. It then goes
on to consider the progress of the case through the Federal Court,
highlighting the various factors that have attracted the Court's attention at
each stage. It first considers the judgment of Allsop J, and his unusual
invitation to the Australian Government to make submissions regarding
aspects of the case. It then analyses the decision of the Appeal Court,
concluding with a consideration of the case's broader Antarctic context
and possible implications for environmental litigation more generally.

Background
Whaling is regulated at international law through the International
Whaling Commission ('IWC'), established under the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946. Australia and Japan are
*
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1 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116
(Unreported, Black CJ, Moore and Finkelstein JJ, 14 July 2006) ('HSI Case').
2 [2005] FCA 664 (Unreported, Allsop J, 27 May 2005)
3 Available at <http://www.hsi.org.au> at 21 November 2006.
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both parties to the Convention. The IWC has maintained a moratorium
on commercial whaling since the mid-1980s. However Japan has
continued to engage in limited whaling pursuant to the exemption for
scientific research under Article VIII of the convention. At the time of
the alleged offences, the respondent, Kyodo, was whaling pursuant to a
special research permit issued by the Japanese Government.
In its application to the Federal Court, HSI sought the enforcement of
sections of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act 1999 (Cth) ('EPBC Act') that protect whales within the Australian
Whale Sanctuary. HSI also sought a declaration that the activities of
Kyodo in the Australian Whale Sanctuary were illegal. 4
The Australian Whale Sanctuary ('AWS ') was established under section
225 of the EPBC Act, 'in order to give formal recognition of the high
level of protection and management afforded to cetaceans in
Commonwealth marine areas and prescribed waters.' 5 The location of
the AWS is defined principally by reference to Australia's exclusive
economic zone ('EEZ').6 It includes the waters offshore the AAT, up to
200nm from baselines. 7
A broad range of activities affecting whales are declared to be offences
under Part 13 Division 3 of the EPBC Act. These include killing or
injuring a cetacean, taking or interfering with a cetacean, possessing a
cetacean, and treating (ie processing) a cetacean. 8 Penalties are substantial
and vary depending upon whether the offence is fault-based or one of
strict liability. 9

The Case at First Instance
Procedural issues
Application of the provisions of the EPBC Act depends upon the location
of the relevant offence. Outside the AWS, they apply only to Australian
citizens, permanent residents, Australian companies, the Commonwealth
and its agencies, Australian aircraft and vessels, and members of the crew
of Australian vessels and aircraft. 1o Within the AWS they apply to all
Pursuant to the Federal Court ofAustralia Act 1977 (Cth) s 21.
s 225(1).
6 EPBC Act s 225(2).
7 Proclamation of26 July 1994 under the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) in
Commonwealth Gazette No S290, 29 July 1994.
8 EPBC Act ss 229, 229A, 229B, 229C, 229D and 230.
9 Penalties are up to two years imprisonment and/or $111,000 fine for standard offences,
and a maximum of$55,000 fine for strict liability offences (s 4AA(I) Crimes Act 1914
(Cth) currently provides that 1 penalty unit is $110).
10 EPBC Act s 224(2).

4

5 EPBC Act
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persons, all aircraft and all vessels. 11 According to HSI's statement of
claim, Kyodo whaled within two different sectors of Australia's Antarctic
whale sanctuary during alternate seasons. 12
If certain conditions are met, the EPBC Act permits an 'interested person'
(who may be an individual or an organisation) to obtain an injunction
restraining conduct in contravention of its provisions. 13 An individual or
organisation may be an 'interested person' because they have interests
that are affected by the relevant conduct, or by virtue of environmental
research, protection or conservation activities undertaken by them in the
previous two years. 14
HSI fulfilled the requirements for an interested person under the EPBC
Act and was therefore entitled to bring enforcement proceedings under the
Act. IS Because the respondent is located in Japan, however, the Federal
Court Rules required HSI to seek the leave of the Court before it could
serve its originating process. The relevant rule states that:
The Court may, by order, give leave to serve originating process
outside the Commonwealth ... if the Court is satisfied that:
(a) the Court has jurisdiction in the proceeding; and
(b) rule 1 applies to the proceeding; and
(c) the party seeking leave has a prima facie case for the relief
sought by the party in the proceeding. 16

There are therefore three questions that the Federal Court must answer in
the affirmative before allowing an application to proceed. They deal with
jurisdiction, the application of rule 1 (grounds for service), and prima
facie case.
In the present case, the Federal Court has clearly been granted jurisdiction
under section 475(1) of the EPBC Act. This section states that an
'interested person ... may apply to the Federal Court for an injunction' in
circumstances where 'a person has engaged, engages or proposes to
engage in conduct consisting of an act or omission that constitutes an
offence or other contravention of this Act or the regulations ... '.
The second question, that of grounds for service, must be answered by
reference to the grounds set out in Order 8 Rule 1 of the Federal Court
Rules. Rule 1 allows an originating process to be served outside Australia
EPBCActs 5(4).
The AAT is divided into two sectors, separated by the French-claimed Adelie Land. At
various times, Kyodo is alleged to have conducted whaling operations in the waters
offshore each sector.
13 EPBCAct s 475(1).
14 EPBC Act s 475(6) and (7).
15 [2004] FCA 1510 (Unreported, Allsop J, 23 November 2004) [15].
16 Federal Court Rules 08 r2(2).
11

12
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in various circumstances, principally where various actions or
circumstances are located 'in the Commonwealth', but also more
generally where the proceedings concern 'the construction, effect or
enforcement of an Act' .17 Allsop J found that this particular ground was
satisfied, thereby providing a basis for service outside the jurisdiction. 18
On the third question, and subject to various questions of statutory
interpretation,19 Allsop J was satisfied that affidavits filed on behalf of
the applicant provided sufficient evidence of a breach of the EPBe Act to
satisfy the requirement for a prima facie case. 20 There were therefore no
serious doubts that HSI could meet the three requirements in Order 8
Rule 2(2). Instead, the case ultimately turned on the issue of whether or
not the Court had a residual discretion, after these three conditions had
been met, which would allow a judge to nevertheless refuse leave to
proceed.

Political circumstances
Allsop J gave his first instance judgment in two stages - a preliminary
judgment that is expressed to be 'subject to hearing and considering any
submissions to the contrary from the Attorney-General' ,21 and a
subsequent decision that takes the Attorney-General's amicus
submissions into account. 22
From the outset, Allsop J indicated that, in his opInIon, external
circumstances would impact on the outcome of the case.
At the hearing of the application ... I expressed the view that it may be
that the Australian Government would wish to put submissions on the
proper construction and interpretation of the legislation and treaties
involved, in particular in the light of what might be seen to be
Australia's national interest, including inter-governmental relations
between Australia and Japan. 23

17 Federal

Court Rules 08 rl(l).

18 [2005] FCA 664 [42].
19 In particular, whether or not the pennit to conduct scientific whaling issued by the
Government of Japan to Kyodo was a 'recognised foreign authority' under s 7(1) of the
Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 (Cth), thereby overriding the
operation of the EPBC Act: EPBC Act s 9.
20 [2004] FCA 1510 par 24. Evidence filed by the applicant is available at
<http://www.hsi.org.au> at 21 November 2006.
21 [2004] FCA 1510 [6].
22 [2005] FCA 664.
23 [2004] FCA 1510 [3].
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The Australian Government's submissions 24 indicated a belief that Japan
would view any attempt to enforce Australian law in the Antarctic EEZ
against Japanese whalers as a breach of international law. Furthermore,
because of the sensitive nature of Antarctic sovereignty claims, the
enforcement of domestic laws against foreigners would probably also
lead to an adverse reaction by other Antarctic Treaty parties. 25
Because of uncertainty over Australian sovereignty claims in
Antarctica,26 it has been the Government's practice to only enforce
Australian law in Antarctica against foreigners who have submitted to the
jurisdiction. 27 Therefore, although the EPBe Act applies as a matter of
Australian law, the 'pursuit of diplomatic solutions' has been seen as a
'more appropriate' response to the issues posed by Japanese whaling
offshore the Australian Antarctic Territory. 28
Allsop J's conclusion

Allsop J ultimately decided to refuse HSI's application to serve
originating process in Japan. There were two main reasons for this
decision. First, His Honour was concerned that the litigation would be
futile, it being unlikely that Kyodo would enter into the proceedings or
accept any resulting injunction. "Relevant to such a consideration here
are the facts that there is no apparent reason for any of the ships of the
respondent (apart from requiring refuge) to call into Australian ports and
that there is no place of business of the respondent in Australia. Also, as
the issue is one for public law, it cannot be expected that Japanese courts
would give effect to an injunction."29
Allsop J's second reason for denying HSI leave to proceed related to the
political dimensions of the dispute. He noted that Japan would view the
Australian assertion of jurisdiction as without foundation under
international law. His Honour stated:
Futility will be compounded by placing the Court at the centre of an
international dispute ... between Australia and a friendly foreign

Outline ofSubmissions ofthe Attorney General ofthe Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae,
available at <http://www.hsi.org.au> at 21 November 2006, summarised by Allsop J at
[2005] FCA 664 [4]-[17].
25 [2005] FCA 664 [14] (Allsop J).
26 None of the territorial claims in Antarctica is widely recognised. Australia's claim to
sovereignty is recognised only by Britain, New Zealand, France and Norway:
Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law in Antarctica (Nov 1992) 9.
27 Outline ofSubmissions ofthe Attorney General ofthe Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae,
above n 24, [16]; see also Australian Law in Antarctica, above n 26, 16-23.
28 [2005] FCA 664 [16] (Allsop J).
29 [2005] FCA 664 [33] (Allsop J).
24
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power which course or eventuality the Australian Government
believes not to be in Australia's long term national interests... The
case is an unusual one, in which futility is deeply intertwined with
powerful non-justiciable considerations, tending to make it
inappropriate to exercise the discretion [to allow service of process in
Japan]. 30

Judgment on Appeal

HSI appealed against Allsop J's decision on several grounds. These
included a failure to consider the EPBC Act's clear legislative intention to
prohibit whaling by foreigners in the AWS, the irrelevancy of political
and diplomatic considerations to the exercise of the Court's discretion,
and the prima facie right of any applicant to have their case heard by the
court. By a majority of two to one, the appeal was successful. The
remainder of this note will analyse the reasoning of the Full Federal Court
Court's 'discretion'

Black CJ and Finkelstein J gave the joint majority judgment. They
decided that once the three conditions for service outside the jurisdiction
in Order 8 Rule 2 are satisfied, there is no basis upon which the Court
could still refuse leave. Allsop J had erred in refusing to grant leave on
the basis that there was a residual discretion. 31
According to Black CJ and Finkelstein J, '[w]e take it to be settled law
that provided the jurisdiction of the Federal Court is engaged by an action
in respect of a subject-matter with which the Court can deal, and the
action is instituted by an applicant who has standing, and the action is not
oppressive, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process and, finally, the
Court can assume jurisdiction over the defendant (by service or
submission), the Court cannot refuse to adjudicate the dispute.' 32
Political aspects ofdispute

While the political difficulties posed by HSI's action were at the heart of
Allsop J's concerns, all judges in the Full Court agreed that Allsop J had
erred in taking them into account. The majority conceded that in an
exceptional case it may be permissible to refer to political issues in

[2005] FCA 664 [36], [38] (Allsop J).
[2006] FCAFC 116 [10].
32 Ibid, referring to Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay (1988) 165
CLR 197, 239 (Brennan J).
30

31
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deciding whether or not an action should proceed. 33 However that was
certainly not the case, as here, Parliament had specifically stated that a
matter may be brought before an Australian court. 34
Moore J agreed with the majority on this point:
The political repercussions of service of the process and, additionally,
potentially the litigation of this application in an Australian court, are
irrelevant in deciding whether to grant leave. To allow such
considerations to influence the resolution of the application for leave
denies this Court its proper role in our system, of government. Courts
must be prepared to hear and determine matters whatever their
political sensitivity either domestically or internationally.
To
approach the matter otherwise, is to compromise the role of the courts
as the forum in which rights can be vindicated whatever the subjectmatter of the proceedings. 35

Futility ofAction
Futility was the basis upon which Moore J, in the minority, rejected HSI's
application for leave. He characterised Kyodo's connection with Australia
as 'tenuous', pointed out that the proceedings would almost certainly
proceed ex parte, and considered that even if the applicant was successful
in obtaining relief, that relief was unlikely to be effective. 'Indeed, the
position of the appellant appeared to involve an acceptance that no
enforceable injunction will be granted but that, at least in part, any
declaration would operate to influence the Japanese Government, which
is not a party to the proceedings.'36 According to Moore J, this was not a
legitimate use of the Court process. 37
Although the majority did not need to consider this issue, they
nevertheless devoted a considerable part of their judgment to the question
of how the Court should deal with these allegations of futility. The first
issue Black CJ and Finkelstein J considered was the stage of litigation at
which futility should be addressed. In their view it was premature to
consider the issue at this early stage of applying for leave to serve
process. It was more appropriately dealt with in an application to set
aside service, or (preferably) when the primary matter itself is heard. 38

33 [2006] FCAFC 116 [13], referring to R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC 61.
34 [2006] FCAFC 116 [13].
35 [2006] FCAFC 116 [38].
36 [2006] FCAFC 116 [46].
37 [2206] FCAFC 116 [47].
38 [2006] FCAFC 116 [14].
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In particular the Court should not presume at this early stage in
proceedings that an injunction, if granted, would in fact be ignored. 39
The majority were also concerned that Allsop J's approach
inappropriately placed the onus of proof on the applicant. '[I]t seems to
us that the judge in effect imposed upon [HSI] the obligation of showing
that an injunction would be a useful remedy. In fact the reverse is true. It
is the defendant who has the onus of showing that it has no assets within
the jurisdiction which could be sequestrated in punishment for
contempt' .40
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the majority stated that the nature
of the enforcement provisions of the EPBC Act was relevant to any
assessment of futility. They noted that the relevant provisions are broadly
drafted and in the nature of a 'public interest injunction'. 41 Therefore an
injunction might not be seen as futile simply because it was likely to be
ignored by the defendant, because it could legitimately serve other
purposes, for example, educative purposes.
Although 'deterrence' is more commonly used in the vocabulary of
the law than 'education', the two ideas are closely connected and must
surely overlap in areas where a statute aims to regulate conduct. ...
[T]he grant of a statutory public interest injunction to mark the
disapproval of the Court of conduct which the Parliament has
proscribed, or to discourage others from acting in a similar way, can
be seen as also having an educative element. For that reason alone the
grant of such an injunction may be seen, here, as potentially advancing
the regulatory objects of the EPBe Act. 42

Conclusion

The point decided by the HSI Case is relatively narrow: in a decision
whether or not to grant leave for an applicant to serve process outside the
jurisdiction under the Federal Court Rules, the Court is to have regard
only to the three conditions set down in Order 8 Rule 2, namely
jurisdiction, grounds of service, and prima facie case. In particular,
political considerations are not relevant to the decision.
When viewed in its broader context, however, the case raises many more
interesting issues. One issue relates to the crossover between politics and
law, and the question of how and when courts can deal with issues that

[2006] FCAFC
[2006] FCAFC
41 [2006] FCAFC
42 [2006] FCAFC
39

40

116 [16].
116 [15].
116 [18].
116 [22].
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raise significant political questions. The contrast between the judgment at
first instance, and the judgments on appeal, is quite marked on this issue.
In general· terms the argument of Moore J is compelling: courts should
not be swayed by political considerations in the resolution of disputes that
are brought before them. To decide otherwise is to compromise the
proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society. However in the
particular circumstances of this case, Allsop J was also correct to be
concerned about the impact of the litigation. None of the judges on
appeal acknowledged the delicate balancing act that has historically taken
place in relation to the application and enforcement of laws in
Antarctica. 43
Two features of the EPBC regime are particularly significant in the
context of Australian law for the AAT. The first feature is the lack of any
qualification requiring the whaling provisions to be read subject to
international law. 44 The second feature is the importation of broad
enforcement provisions, including the capacity for third-party
enforcement, that over time have become characteristic of environmental
laws but have not previously been part of Australia's Antarctic legal
regime.
Allowing for the whale protection laws to be enforced at the behest of an
'interested party' has removed the government's control over the
enforcement of laws in Antarctica. This is contrary to the manner in
which Antarctic activities have previously been dealt with, and puts at
risk the mechanism that has historically been used to diffuse any conflict
between Australia's sovereignty claim and its desire to work cooperatively within the Antarctic Treaty System.
At the same time the case provides good news for environmental groups
seeking to enforce statutory obligations through public interest litigation.
The comments of the majority judges concerning the legitimate purposes
for which injunctive and declaratory relief may be sought, and
recognition of the broader deterrent and educative goals of environmental
legislation, should prove useful more generally where third-party
enforcement of statutory provisions is sought.

43 Joanna Mossop charmingly refers to this balancing act as a 'delicate diplomatic dance':
Joanna Mossop, 'When is a Whale Sanctuary Not a Whale Sanctuary? Japanese Whaling in
Australian Antarctic Maritime Zones' (2005) 36 VUWLR 757, 767. The application and
enforcement of Australian law in Antarctica is discussed at length in House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Australian Law
in Antarctica (November 1992).
44 Cf Whale Protection Act 1980 (Cth) s 6(3).

